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ABSTRACT
Market-based instruments for pollution control have received large attention during the
last years due to increasing costs of pollution abatement and the need for more flexibility
among emitting sources to comply with environmental regulations. The evidence,
however, has shown some implementation problems with such instruments. A classic
example of such problems is the Fox River permit program, in Wisconsin. This thesis
focuses on the performance of transferable discharge permits (TDPs) for water pollution
control, in particular biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) discharges.
Uncertainty and transaction costs, among others factors , can adversely affect the trading
activity in a market for water pollution as well as in others. Uncertainty comes from the
fact that regulatory authority needs directly or indirectly to intervene within market to
prevent future violations in the water quality standards, and also by the fact that permit
prices do not necessarily remain constant over time. The effects of uncertainty and
transaction costs are studied by using two models: (1) a one-period model that shows how
authority's approval requirements can affect trading activity; and (2) a two-period model
that shows how a conditional TDP system that accounts for price variability affects
irreversible investments in waterwaste treatment capacity and hence trading incentives.
The study concludes that trading incentives can be significantly reduced by these adverse
factors. Despite them, however, TDPs still can offer more cost-effective solutions than
command-and-control approaches in dealing with the water pollution problem. We also
include some policy implications regarding these matters.
Thesis Advisor: A. Denny Ellerman
Title: Senior Lecturer Sloan School of Management, and
Director Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research(CEEPR)
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I. INTRODUCTION
Market-based instruments for pollution control have received large attention
during the last years due to increasing costs of pollution abatement and the need for more
flexibility among emitting sources to comply with environmental regulations. 1
Marketable permits is one of the most attractive of such instruments for being both cost-
effective and environmental quality based. It has been considered and used for different
environmental regulatory purpose including water pollution control.2 Despite the large
"potential" savings estimated from water pollution markets the evidence tells us that
trading activity has been quite low. Uncertainty, among others factors , can adversely
affect the trading activity. In a market for water pollution control uncertainty may come
from the fact that regulatory authority needs directly or indirectly to intervene to prevent
violations in water quality standards due to market activity. This thesis is concerned with
the role of that uncertainty in explaining, at least partially, the low activity in the water
pollution markets.
Much of the literature on permits for water pollution control focuses on the
potential savings of using this regulatory approach over the traditional command-and-
control approach.3 O'Neil (1980) analyzed the use of a transferable discharge permit
(TDP) system to reduce discharges of biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) among 14
polluters in the Lower Fox River. The study concluded that the abatement costs to
1 Nominal pollution control expenditures in the United States have risen from $18 to $78 billion during the
period 1972-1986. Currently, about 2% of the entire gross national product is used to address
environmental problems (Hahn, 1989b, p.3) and it is expected to rise up to 2.6% by the end of the century.
2 See Hahn (1989a), Hahn (1989b, pp .23 and 46-47), and Moore et al (1989) for a description of existing
marketable permits programs.
3 The command-and-control approach consists basically in two instruments: technology and emission
standards. The Clean Water Act currently provides a two-tiered approach to water quality protection. At a
minimum, technology-based requirements limiting pollutant concentrations in effluents must be attained by
all point source discharges. These requirements takes the form of nationally uniform standards for classes
and categories of industries, and a parallel approach for publicly owned treatment works (POTWs) and
their indirect discharges. For more detail see Portney (1990), and U.S. EPA (1992).
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achieve the dissolved oxygen (DO) level targets would be about 40% higher if the
authority were to rely in a uniform emission (discharge) standard approach. Similarly,
David et al. (1980) concluded that TDPs can be used to control phosphorous effluent into
Lake Michigan at costs that approach the minimum. Furthermore, savings can be even
larger by taking into account the variability of the water bodies assimilative capacity
under a dynamic TDP system.4 O'Neil (1983) used three period flow patterns to estimate
potential savings for the Fox River. Using a dynamic TDPs system original savings can
increase up to 48%. Eheart et al. (1987) showed that by using a similar approach to
control BOD discharges in the Willamette River, Oregon, savings can account from 58%
to 80% (in total costs) compare to the uniform percent BOD removal. Despite these large
potential savings, only a few programs for water pollution control have been
implemented in practice and the results have not been promising. Indeed, markets for
water pollution have poorly performed compared to the criteria air pollutants trading
program and the successful lead trading program (Hahn, 1989b).5
Among the water programs which deserves much attention is the Fox River case
in Wisconsin. Since September 1981. when the Wisconsin Legislature gave final
approval to administrative regulations that provide the possibility for trading permits to
discharge BOD on water quality-limited stream segments, only one trade has occurred.
Why? This thesis intends to help with the answer, at least partially. Furthermore, other
markets for water pollution control have experienced the same fortune. A trading
program between point and nonpoint sources for Dillon Reservoir, Colorado, was
4 The potential for increased benefits through dynamics programs is considerable. Savings in capital and
operating costs may result from programs that allow relatively large discharges during times when
receiving bodies are able to assimilate relatively large waste loads. Such cost savings may justify tightening
standards during the critical periods. However, the savings of using dynamics transferable permits varies
from watercourse to watercourse.
5 The criteria air pollutants trading program started more than a decade ago and covers volatile organic
compounds, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, particulates and nitrogen oxides. The lead trading program,
created in the past decade, allowed gasoline refiners greater flexibility during a period when the amount of
lead in gasoline was being significantly reduced. For more details about these two programs, see Hahn
(1989a), Hahn (1989b, pp. 46-47), Moore et al. (1989), and Hahn and Hester (1989).
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implemented in order to reduce phosphorous discharges to the reservoir. This program
has witnessed only one nonpoint-nonpoint trade since 1984 (U.S. EPA, 1992). Despite
each program is different, it is important to develop a general understanding of the
necessary conditions for these markets to perform well specially when large attention is
now given to TDP systems for water pollution control that includes both point and
nonpoint source trading, and for other environmental problem as well.6
Several authors have focused on the conditions that might affect the trading
activity in the markets for water pollution control and eventually others (Rose-Ackerman,
1977; David and Joeres, 1983; and Moore et al., 1989). There are more than few factors
that could adversely affect the market performance. First, the pre-existing regulatory
framework. A TDP system that constitutes a small part of the current regulatory structure
must be incorporated into the policy decisions on much broader scope (David and Joeres,
1983). Second, monitoring and enforcement. Inappropriate monitoring and enforcement
capabilities may lead to discharges to operate near their permitted limits having no
incentive to trade (David and Joeres, 1983).7 Third, "market conditions" such as low
number of participants, strategic behavior, non-profit maximization behavior, and
transaction costs (O'Neil, 1980; Stavins, 1994).8 Finally, uncertainty coming from
authority intervention in the market.
Although a TDP system reduces the level of "confrontation" between regulator
and the regulated, the involvement of the authority can not be totally reduced because of
technical and political conditions associated with the water system (David et al., 1980).
Any water agency that faces the two-dimension problem of assuring a certain
6 See U.S. EPA (1992) for water; Nichols (1993) for S02; and Bohm (1993) for C02.
7 Penalties in violations must be immediate, known a priori and large in relation to marginal treatment
costs, and enough to not threaten the existence of the enterprise (David and Joeres, 1983).
8 Among the above we only consider transaction costs. We assume for the moment that agents are profit
maximizers and that there is a sufficient number of potential traders. Note, however, that markets for water
pollution are rather small and usually include public utilities. The latter makes TDP even less attractive.
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environmental quality level and of reducing the regulatory burden on polluters will need
at some point to intervene within the market either through direct action (e.g. controlling
transfer approval) or through indirect action (e.g. indexing emission rights to watercourse
conditions).
In not considering the factors that can adversely affect the trading activity of a
marketable permit system, potential savings will always be overestimated. Tietenberg
(1985), in a frequently cited table, showed that the ratio of the cost of the actual
command-and-control program to a least-cost benchmark for each case ranged from 22.0
to 1.1. A more realistic comparison, however, should be between actual command-and-
control policies and either actual trading programs or a reasonable constrained theoretical
permit or charge programs (Hahn and Stavins, 1992). Among the few attempts that
incorporate some of the above factors into a model of marketable permits is Stavins
(1994), which studies the effects of transaction costs. However, uncertainty has only be
mentioned throughout the literature with no attempt to model it and hence estimate its
importance. In this thesis, rather than comparing the importance of the different factors,
we want to show that uncertainty at different forms can adversely affect the economic
incentives of the participants and thus the trading activity.
In doing so, we organize the thesis as follows. The next section gives an overview
of the water pollution problem with special emphasis on BOD discharges, and the need
for agency intervention in a TDP system. We also illustrate the practical importance of
agency intervention in existing (e.g. the Fox River) and proposing TDP programs. In
section III, we model both direct and indirect authority intervention and the effects on a
purchaser of TDPs to control BOD. The effects are reflected in the level of control and in
the treatment plant capacity choice. In section IV we develop some additional issues
regarding both direct and indirect intervention. Policy implications and final remarks are
given in V.
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II. THE WATER POLLUTION PROBLEM
One of the most important decisions planners must make in designing any water
quality management program for a particular water body is the form an stringency of the
water quality goal (David and Joeres, 1983). A set of both water pollution and receiving
body conditions shapes the authority's decision regarding the water quality goal and the
way to ensure it over time. Due to these conditions, authority intervention within a
market for water pollution control may be required throughout the program
implementation. The nature of authority intervention and the effects on market
performance are illustrated in this section.
Defining water pollution is not such a simple task because there are many
different substances that can be dissolved or suspended in water. Usually waste
discharges are a mixture of different substances. Much of the material, however, is
biochemical oxygen demanding waste, but other substances include suspended solids,
acids, pathogens, toxic metals, toxic organic chemicals, nutrients that can generate algae
blooms, and so on.9 A second definitional difficulty with water pollution is that it is
relative to the consumer. Nobody "consume pollutants" directly upon discharge. The
relationship between water uses and the waste emitted by any single discharger is not a
simple one. It depends on the characteristics of the stream, the season of the year, the
year, the location of discharges relative to users of water, and the location and waste
discharges of other polluters. All this complexity can have effects on the implementation
and performance of any market for water pollution. 0
The importance of the complexity of the water pollution problem on a potential
market have been commented by a number of authors. Rose-Ackerman (1977) was one of
9 A good description of water pollutants and their sources is found in Davis and Cornwell (1991, pp. 261-
309).
10 Much of this analysis may also apply to other non-conservative pollutants (e.g. NOx).
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the first that point out that a market system cannot simply levy a price on pollution but
must deal with a number of different substances. Thus, in the case of considering a
market for a single pollutant such as biochemical oxygen demand (BOD), regulator
supervision may be needed to control the flow of others pollutants with each transfer of
the above pollutant. l Therefore, in a transferable discharge permit (TDP) system for
BOD control direct intervention in the form of transfer restrictions may be necessary to
prevent violation of water quality standard regarding other pollutants including toxic
substances.
The location of discharges relative to users of water, and the relative location and
waste discharges among polluters has significant implications on water quality levels.
Unlike conservative substances, BOD discharges affect water quality according to their
location magnitude. 12 For illustration of the location problem, think of a TDP program
for BOD control.13 ,14 For example, consider a TDP that allows to discharge "k" pounds
of BOD daily at location "A" on a given river. Consider also a point "Z", critical point,
where dissolved oxygen (DO) is at its lowest level along the section of the river under
consideration. If the TDP is sold and the discharge site changes to location "B", then the
impact on DO level at "Z" can considerably change because of differences in the time of
flow and other stream parameters. It can also occur that "Z" is not longer the critical
11 This is specially important when there is a flow of toxic substances creating hot spots. In theory we can
think of a water pollution market that considers different pollutant at the same time, however its
implementation would be very difficult (Rose-Ackerman, 1977).
12 For more conservative pollutants (e.g. phosphorous) location should not affect much.
13 Permits for BOD control can be defined in two forms. The first called a BOD permit, entitles the holder
to discharge a certain mass of BOD per day. This type of permit is usually known as emission permit
system. The second type of permit entitles a discharger to deplete the dissolved oxygen (DO) at a specific
location in the watercourse. This point usually corresponds to the critical point, where DO level is the
lowest. This latter is called a DODC permit (dissolved oxygen deficit contribution) and it corresponds to an
ambient permit system. Both type of permits are considered as transferable discharge permits (TDP).
14 There are cases where BOD load permit system (emission permit system) could be as efficient as a
DODC permit system (see 13 above). For example, Eheart (1980), showed that for the Willamette River the
difference in cost was at the most 3% depending on the level of control. For this case a emission permit
systems is preferred to an ambient permit system because both it is easier to administer and the difference
in cost is very little.
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point, but a new point "W". An unrestricted permit transfer or set of transfer in a more
complex setting could cause a violation of DO standards unless some type of pre-
approval requirement is considered. 15
A final very important aspect is the variability conditions of the assimilative
capacity of the watercourse.16 O'Neil (1983) studied a market permit system to control
BOD in the Fox River under conditions of varying streamflow and temperature. Eheart et
al. (1987) studied the cost efficiency of time-varying discharge permit programs for BOD
control.17 Both studied concluded that including the variability aspect into the TDP
models, extra savings can be obtained whereas environmental quality is maintained. The
authors, however, considered only a periodic TDP system where flow and temperature
vary in a predictable sequence over the course of an annual cycle. This is a perfect
foresight. Unfortunately, variation of the streamflow rate over the years may be larger
that seasonal variations within a year.18 Under the periodic TDP system, the authority,
and thus society, assumes all of the risk associated with unpredictable fluctuations in
natural stream conditions, since water quality may turn unacceptable even though the
dischargers meet all requirements . The dischargers themselves assume none of the risk,
since their allowable effluents rates are fixed for an annual cycle (Eheart et al., 1987).
The authority, however, could assure environmental quality over the years by controlling
the transfer activity through, for example, a conditional permit system -- indexing
discharge rights to ambient conditions.
15 Most of these complications can be reduce in part by using an ambient permit system. However,
changes in critical points and hence violations can still occur. All this depends finally in conditions given
by the water body and the locations of the emitting sources.
16 The rate of streamflow and temperature are the two the most important physical parameters that affect
the capacity of a stream to assimilate BOD effluent. See O'Neil (1983).
17 Eheart et al. (1987) proposed, for example, that allowable discharge permits might be proportional to the
streamflow.
18 This property varies from river to river and it depends on physical and hydrological conditions For
example, seasonal variations of the rate of streamflow for the Fox River are significantly smaller than
variations over the years; see O'Neil (1980, p. 119).
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Different types of transfer restrictions can be used by the authority to prevent
violation in the water quality standards, some more direct than others. 19 Among the
alternatives, the ad hoc approval approach is the most common. Under this approach any
TDP exchange must be approved by the water pollution control authority (Eheart et al.,
1983). The Fox River TDP program, in Wisconsin, implemented to control BOD
discharges is an illustrative example of ad hoc approval mechanism (David and Joeres,
1983). U.S. EPA (1992, p.22) also comments about the Fox River program as:
"Numerous administrative requirements also added to the cost of trades and
decreased incentives for facilities to participate. Wisconsin Department of Natural
Resources (WDNR) must approved the proposed trades and modify the permits of
the trading facilities. This process can take a minimum of six months. The lengthy
permit revision process further reduces the value of the potential discharge
allocations. Additionally, transaction costs from trading became prohibitively
high because there was no brokering or banking function. The administrative
approval process is also complicated by the fact that the pollution problem is not
limited to BOD, but includes toxic organic compounds from paper mill effluents.
Some proposed trades might have led to high local concentrations of toxic
pollutants and may not have passed administrative review."
Eheart et al. (1983) also notices the adverse effects under the ad hoc approach by
increasing transactions costs and administrative costs for the water quality agency (which
can be passed to TDP buyers and sellers in the form of transactions costs as well). Also,
dischargers could face the expense of countering public opposition whether it
materializes or not representing significant time delays. The presence of additional
transactions costs and the uncertainty about the transfer approval, and their effects on
dischargers' decision regarding TDP exchanges are the topics of the first model in section
III.
In some cases indirect authority intervention is an alternative for preventing future
violations. These are types of transfer restrictions that place general constraints on
exchanges, but do not require as much administrative burden on each exchange as the ad
19 Eheart et al., 1983 studied the following approaches to prevent or to reduce the likelihood of violations
of a given water quality standard: ad hoc approvals, limiting the number of permits, limiting the aggregate
discharge in subregions of the watercourse, preventing transfers across geographical boundaries, revaluing
the permits automatically and uniformly when exchanged, and using combinations of these approaches.
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hoc approval approach.2 0 Restrictions could be applied in the context of a decentralized
market or in the context of a systematic trading sessions organized, for example, by the
water agency (Eheart et al., 1983). For example, the use of a conditional permit system
would allow the authority to account for future changes in stream conditions. It would be
able to increase or decrease the total quantity of permits at the end of each period if the
previous calculations as to the assimilative capacity appear to be too lenient or too
stringent. TDPs are then issued for a limited period, and their transfer is in effect a lease
rather than a sale alienating the right forever (David et al., 1980).
Unfortunately, under this approach the purchase of TDPs would not be riskless.
Under conditional permits more responsibility for water quality maintenance is borne
directly by the discharges. Unlike periodic TDP system, dischargers' investment decisions
under conditional permits will have to account for uncertainty in the frequency, duration,
price, and stringency of future treatment requirements and the penalty for violating those
requirements (David et al., 1980; and Eheart et al., 1987). Prices are subject to change if a
conditional TDP system is implemented. In addition, prices may either rise as population
and industrial development increases or fall as cheaper control technology is developed.
This uncertainty in future prices may induce all operators to install treatment facilities as
a hedge against the risk of high-cost rights in the future or to refuse to lease their excess
TDPs (David et al., 1980).21 The effect of price uncertainty on the installed capacity
choice decision is treated with the second model in section III. Particularly, we are
interested in how reversible (purchasing of TDPs) and irreversible investments (waste
treatment facilities) are affected by TDP price uncertainty.
20 Some of these are: limiting the aggregate discharge in subregions of the watercourse, preventing
transfers across geographical boundaries, revaluing the permits automatically and uniformly when
exchanged.
21 David et al. (1980) referred only to more conservative operators.
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III. THE MODEL
Dales (1968) was the first in propose the idea of using tradable emissions rights to
distribute the pollution-reduction burden among firms in a cost-effective manner. Once
property (emission) rights are clearly defined it is expected firms to trade and eventually
reach the cost-effective equilibrium. This is possible, as pointed out by Coase (1960),
only in absence of transaction costs. Throughout this section we will show how
transaction costs and uncertainty impede to reach such an equilibrium. Before move on, I
should mention that the cost-effective solution is derived in the appendix.
We will consider two cases of trading from the perspective of a purchaser of
TDPs that must comply with BOD standards: (1) trading under the ad hoc approval
mechanism, which includes transaction costs and uncertainty about the approval; and (2)
trading under a conditional permit system, which includes irreversible investment (waste
treatment facilities) and permit price uncertainty. Transaction costs are not considered in
the latter case.2 2
3.1 Uncertainty, Transaction Costs and the Ad Hoc Approval Approach
The desirability of seeking TDPs to control BOD discharges will depend on the
amount of savings from using the TDP option and the probability of success in the
transfer. A one-period model formulated in decision theoretic perspective is used to
analyze the investment decision faced by a firm regarding level of pollution control and
TDPs. A similar approach was used by Lund (1993) to study the effects of transaction
risk on the desirability of water transfers.2 3 The investment decision problem studied here
22 The analysis can be easily extended for the case of a seller [of permits].
23 Lund (1993) notices that uncertainty of water transfer approval can have several origins: (1) one or more
state water right regulators must approve a potential water transfer that is by no means certain; (2) even
where regulatory approval is likely, there may be court challenges to the transfer based on regulations or
environmental impacts; and (3) the threat of controversy and expense from regulatory or court challenge
14
is by no means unique to these markets, but it applies to any situation where transaction
costs and uncertainty are likely to occur.
Consider an individual firms (buyer of permits) that receives a certain amount of
BOD discharge rights, qo, freely distributed by the authority,2 4 that can be exchanged.
Assume also that penalties from violations are so high that individuals do not consider
them as any mean of compliance. Under these circumstances, those firms seeking TDPs
will consider the costs of compliance in present value terms. These costs can be grouped
into three categories: pollution abatement costs, costs of purchasing TDPs, and
transaction costs. Capital and operational costs of pollution abatement are assumed to be
certain and equal to CA. This value will depend on the amount of BOD controlled or
reduced by the emitting source. This amount is denoted by r. Thus, we have CA = CA(r).
This a twice differentiable, convex and increasing function.2 5 Costs of purchasing TDPs,
Cp, is given by the price, p, of each permit, and the number of permits, x. For a buyer of
TDPs whose unrestricted emissions or discharges are equal to u, x corresponds to
x =u-r-qo, (1)
where x, u, r, and qo can be measured in kg/day of BOD. In order to comply with the
regulations eq. (1) must hold all the time. Before explaining the nature of transaction
costs, let me add that at this point, the individual firm faces two options to comply with
environmental standards. The first is to disregard TDPs and to control BOD discharges
by u - qo units, at a total cost equal to CA( - qo). The second option is to buy some TDPs
and to control at a lower level. The second option, however, is uncertain by reasons
can dissuade potential buyers from continuing the pursuit of water transfers. He also suggested that many of
these features may occur in transfers of water pollution rights.
24 The method of distribution can also have impacts on the market performance; see Eheart et al. (1980).
25 This assumption is valid for most pollution control cost functions. See Tietenberg (1992, pp. 360-391).
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detailed in previous sections. Then, there is a probability of success, Ps, in getting the
transfer approval from the water agency.
The desirability of seeking TDPs to control BOD discharges will not only be
subject to Ps, but also to those costs associated to the exchange of any property right; the
transaction costs. They are present because parties to potential exchanges must find one
another, communicate, exchange information, do legal and technical work to support the
transfer, face approval's delays, etc.26 The transaction costs of any potential exchange of
TDPs to control BOD may be divided in two parts: the transaction costs to support the
transfer approval, TA, and the additional transaction costs borne after the approval and
required to complete the transfer, TT. TA would include the expected value of the
resources spent to support a transfer before it is approved or rejected. The resources are in
the form of technical, administrative and legal work accompanied by lengthy approval
processes.2 7 Much of the bargaining, searching and information expenditures are included
in TA as well. TT, borne when the approval is obtained, would include some additional
technical work but specially the legal work associated to the exchange itself. Although
there may be a sublet distinction between the nature of TA and TT, there is a clear
distinction about the economic return of each one. If the transfer is rejected, the return
from TA is zero. Later in the thesis we come back to the distinction between TA and TT.
If an amount x of TDPs is attempted and succeeds the total cost of compliance (in
present value terms) is given by TA + TT + CA(r = u - x - qo) + Cp(x), where r is obtained
from eq. (1). Hereafter we will use just r to refer u - x - qo. If the attempted transfer fails,
the total cost (in present terms) is given by TA + CA(U - qo). The choice of seeking TDPs
is illustrated by the decision tree in Figure 1.
26 Transaction costs are also evident because the need to inspect and measure the goods to be transferred,
draw up contracts. consult with lawyers and others experts, transfer title, etc. A good description is in
Stavins (1994).
2 7 Third parties such as companies with no access to the permit system and environmental groups can have
some effect on the decision making process. Additional future exchanges can be affected by this one, so
companies in the system can influence the process as well.
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Figure 1. Decision tree corresponding to investment alternatives for BOD
control under conditions of uncertainty about the approval (Ps) and
transaction costs (TA and TT).
The choice is reduced to two options: one with TDPs given by
TECT = Ps(CA(r) + Cp + TA + TT) + (1 - Ps).(TA+ CA(u - o)), (2)
where TECT is the total expected cost of BOD control with "transfers," and Cp is equal to
p.x, with p assumed exogenous (for thin markets this latter observation may not hold).
The second option that does not consider TDPs is given by
TCNT = CA(U - qo). (3)
where TCNT is total cost of compliance with no "transfers." A risk neutral agent will
attempt the transfer option as long as TECT < TCNT.28 If TECT = TCNT such agent will
be indifferent between the two options. There is, however, a first necessary condition for
the TDP option to be desirable, that is Cp + CA(r) < CA(U - qo). This necessary, but not
28 A risk averse agent will include a risk premium making TCT to increase.
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sufficient, condition implies that in the absence of transaction costs, the TDP option could
be pursued only if there is some savings, AC, given by
AC = CA( - qo) - CA(r) - Cp. (4)
The expected present value of total cost savings from considering the TDP option
is expressed by the difference between TCNT and TECT. Using eq. (2) and (3) leads to
TCNT - TECT = CA(U - qo) - Ps(CA(r) + Cp + TA + TT)
- (1 - Ps).(TA+ CA(U - q0)), (5)
and if we rearrange terms and use (4), we obtain a new expression for (5) given by
TCNT - TECT = (AC - TT)Ps - TA. (5a)
If TCNT - TECT is equal to zero, a risk neutral agent will be indifferent between
the two options. Then, an indifference point can be established by setting (5a) equal to
zero. This yields to
TAAC = + TT. (6)Ps
Eq. (6) shows the importance of uncertainty in the transfer approval (Ps) and the
distribution of transaction costs before and after the approval (TA and TT respectively)
for the decision process of any potential buyer of TDPs. Initial savings in absence of
transaction costs, AC, can be reduced at a point where the TDP option is not longer
attractive.
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A numerical example gives us better understanding of the decision investment
situation. Consider initial savings (in absence of transaction costs) AC = 100, and
probability of success Ps = 0.5. Additionally assume that only 20% of initial savings will
be spent on transaction costs after the approval (TT = 20). Under these circumstances a
risk neutral rational agent would be willing to spend at most 40% of the initial savings in
transaction costs associated to the approval (TA = 40). Under conditions of certainty,
conversely, the same agent would be willing to pay up to 80% of the initial savings.
The importance of the result is also illustrated in Figure 2. Given TA and TT
(assumed fixed amounts at this point), we can draw the indifference curve TA/PS + TT.
Additionally we can draw a curve AC = AC(Ps). We can expect that AC is a decreasing
function in Ps because as AC decreases trading opportunities increases (larger number of
potential partners) and so does Ps. The exact shape of the curve, however, is of no
importance to illustrate the issue. Later in the thesis we will discuss some relationship
between amount of trading and transaction costs. In Figure 2(a), the point where both
curves crosses, I, is the indifferent point. To the right of I, the transfer attempt will be
pursued because the expected gains of using the TDP option are greater than zero. If
instead we consider a risk averse agent, which is very realistic for public utilities and
some private firms, AC shifts down by an amount equal to the risk premium obtaining
AC and a new indifferent point I'. The effects of risk adversity is to discourage transfer
attempts even more. As a complement, in Figure 2(b) we present a different AC curve
where transfer attempts are feasible only between I and 12 (for a risk neutral agent). The
shape of AC will finally determine the level of expected transfer attempts and hence
trading activity.
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Figure 2. The TDP option will be attempted when AC is greater than TA/PS + TT
(for a risk averse agent consider AC'). In case (a) this occurs to the
right of I, while in (b) it occurs between I1 and 12. The shape of AC
will finally determine the range where attempts are feasible.
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Interaction between regulator and regulated
The preceding analysis assumes that the probability of success, Ps, is independent
of the amount of effort agents devote to make the transfer successful. In reality there is an
interaction between agents and the corresponding authority that may affect Ps. This
interaction will be subject to the technical and political conditions related to both the
transfer and the water system. For example, a low amount of TDPs being exchanged in a
system where location does not considerably affect the configuration of critical points is
more likely to succeed.29 We assume here that the probability of success, Ps, will be
subject to the amount of TDPs, x; and the amount of effort spent by the agent during the
transfer approval process, TA. Eheart et al., (1983) suggested that the ad hoc approval
approach could be formalized by approving TDP exchanges whenever the buyer or seller
could demonstrate that no new violation of the water quality standard would occur. The
amount of technical work that this will require is part of TA. Additionally, an agent may
be willing to compensate third parties for some negative effects.3 0 Finally, it is expected
that these frictions decrease as the amount of TDPs does. Therefore, there is functional
form (unknown) for Ps as PS(TA, x).
The function Ps(TA,x) will be assumed to be continuous throughout the domains
of its variables, twice-differentiable respect to TA and x.31 Additionally, Ps it is assumed
to be an increasing function in TA, and decreasing function in x. These conditions are
29 Eheart (1980), for example, points out that the location of the critical points for dissolved oxygen (DO)
level for the Willamette River in Oregon would be always the same regardless the combination of BOD
treatment level of the eleven discharges.
30 Eheart et al. (1983) notices that "inefficiencies" could arise when potential transfers are evaluated
independently. For example, two possible transfer could be independently acceptable, but unacceptable in
combination. In this situation one firm may be willing to compensate others in order to go ahead with the
transfer.
31 It might be the case of a discontinuous function (Lund, 1993).
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aP(TAx) aPs(TA,x)(aTA > 0, and < 0. (7)
There is final aspect regarding functional form of transaction costs that deserves mention.
There is evidence that transaction costs, TA and TT, and the amount of TDPs, x, are
related. 3 2 We assume increasing functions in x, but recognizing that part of TA and TT
may be fixed (or independent of x). To better understand, think of a total amount of
transaction cost TC = TA + TT that increases in x, and in which TA and TT have to be
distributed between before and after approval. Notice that TA and TT need not to be
perfect substitutes -- there are some expenditures exclusively associated with TA.
Eventually, you can manage to increase TA without changes on x, in order to increase the
probability of success, Ps. The effects of different functional forms are discussed in
section IV.
This interaction between regulator and regulated leads to a subsidiary decision
making problem (Lund, 1993). Assuming that an agent is choosing the TDP option to
comply with regulations, they now will estimate the amount of them that can make the
transfer successful. Using an expected monetary value decision criterion, we next analyze
the optimal allocation of resources made by a buyer of TDPs. By substituting Ps(TA,x)
into eq. (2) leads to
TECT = Ps(TA,x).(CA(r) + Cp + TA + TT) + (1 - Ps(TA,X)).(TA+ CA(u - qo)), (8)
where TECT is the expected total cost, and TA and x are our decision variables. While TA
affects only Ps, x affects Ps, CA(r), Cp, TA, and TT. Replacing CA(r) by CA(X) according
32 Stavins (1994) defines a common transaction cost function, tc(x), for which tc'(x) > 0, and for which
tc"(x) may be positive, negative or zero-valued. He gives a good description about the nature and effects of
different transaction costs functions.
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to (1), and minimizing TECT by setting the derivatives respect to x and TA equal to zero,
we obtain that
TECT Ps(TA,) (CA) + C(x) + TT(X) - CA(u-qo))
ax ax -
+ Ps(TA,x)( aCA(x aTT( X))+ aTA()9)
a x a x = 0
aTECT aPs(TA,x) (CA(x) + Cp(x) + TT(x) - CA(U-qo)) + (10)
aTA - )TA
Rearranging terms and dividing (9) by (10) leads to
aCA(x) aTT(x) aTA(x) 1 DaPs/ax 1
ax P 3x + ix Ps -Ps/TAPs' (11)
and we know, by the chain rule and (1), that in the case of a purchaser of TDPs we have
that
acA(r) aA(xA) x aCA(x)
ar -x ar= ax (12)
and replacing (12) into ( 11) we finally obtain an equilibrium solution given by
aCA(r) aTT(x)+ aTA(x) 1 aPs/ax 1 
ar ax a+ x Ps -aPs/aTAPs (13)
where the last term represents the interaction effect. Eq. (13) implies that in contrast to
the cost-effective or least-cost solution (detailed in the appendix), in this case we obtain
that agents would control pollution at a marginal cost equal to the "sum" of permit prices,
marginal transaction costs and a risk component. The total cost of pollution control,
however, would be the sum of capital and operational costs, transaction costs, and the
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amount of TDPs purchased. Then, risk has an indirect effect on the total cost of control
by affecting the level of pollution control r. In other words, risk can not be considered as
an incurred cost, rather as forgone benefit.
In order to better understand the implications of eq. (13), it is useful to show two
particular cases. First, if Ps is given and independent of x and TA eq. (13) reduces to
DCA(r) aTT(x) + TA(x) 13a)
Dr p + x a x P-'
Notice the similarity with (6). Second, if agents are always certain about the approval,
which means the Ps is independent of x and TA and equal to 1, equation (13) becomes
DCA(r) aT(x) (3b)
dr -+ '
where TC are the total transaction costs equal to TA + TT. This latter is the result obtained
by Stavins (1994), who in addition considers different transaction costs functions and
studies the importance of the initial allocation, qO, when transaction costs were non-zero.
In this thesis we certainly consider such transaction costs, but we rather focus on the
effects of uncertainty in the equilibrium solution.
By first looking at eq. (13b), we see that the original cost-effective or least-cost
solution will not be achieved. It is clear that if marginal transaction costs associated with
the transfer are non-zero, the purchaser of TDPs will choose for more pollution reduction
-- higher level of r -- and lower amount of x. This is because the marginal cost of
pollution control and the marginal transaction cost increase increases with r and x
respectively. In the aggregate level, BOD discharges will be lower than in the absence of
transaction costs. Since, usually transaction costs are considered real resource costs, we
may refer to this new equilibrium -- eq. (13b) -- as a "cost-effective equilibrium in the
presence of transaction costs." Notice, however, that the new cost-effective solution
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involves greater aggregate costs of compliance compare to the "cost-effective solution in
absence of transaction costs." The important issue is then to estimate the true costs of
control and hence the real potential savings.
Now, by looking at equation (13a) we find that uncertainty makes the true costs of
control even higher. As long as Ps < 1 the level of BOD control will be even higher and
the amount of trading lower. Although uncertainty does not absorb resources directly it
suppresses incentives for trading what leads to an equilibrium solution even further from
the "cost-effective solution in absence of transaction costs." Finally, by looking eq. (13)
again, it seems that the situation gets even worse (in terms of overall costs) because the
interaction term is negative (Ps/x < 0 according to (7)). However the presence of an
interaction term has ambiguous effects on the level of control r -- it could be the same,
higher or lower, but never as in (13b). This ambiguity comes from the fact that agents can
manage TA making the transfer more or less likely and the fact that changes in x or TA
affect Ps differently. Agents behavior will finally depend upon the functional forms
assumed for PS(TA,x), TA(X), and TT(X). We discuss the ambiguity issue along with the
optimal distribution of transaction costs before and after approval in section IV.
Transaction costs and uncertainty increase the overall cost of control by absorbing
resources directly (TA and TT) and by suppressing exchanges that otherwise would have
been mutually beneficial.3 3 The effects on the overall costs will finally depends on the
risk behavior response, the relationship among different variables, and the initial
allocation of emission rights. A more conservative agent, for example, will control more
pollution in presence of risk -- cases (13) and (1 3a).
Without defining any functional forms for TA, TT and P, there are some
additional comments. The consequences of transaction costs transaction costs and
33 The reduction on overall welfare is mimimum when the initial allocation of emission rights approaches
the least cost-solution. The initial allocation of rights, however, is subject to imperfect information and
equity considerations. Optimal allocation of emission rights under imperfect information has been
discussed by Pitchford (1993).
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uncertainty in the final configuration of pollution-reduction burden among firms may
depend upon the initial allocation of emissions rights. We can follow the analysis done by
Stavins (1994) and show that the final configuration may be affected only in the presence
of either decreasing or increasing marginal transaction costs. Given an initial distribution
of emissions rights, decreasing marginal transaction costs can take us a bit closer to the
cost-effective solution, while increasing marginal transaction costs can do the opposite.
Uncertainty, however, will always drives us far form the original cost-effective solution.
Therefore, uncertainty and transaction costs should also be considered in the design the of
initial allocation of emission rights.
3.2 Uncertainty and the Conditional Transferable Discharge Permits (TDPs)
We now turn in a second type of restriction on TDP exchanges. It is in the context
of a "decentralized" market. Here, the authority indirectly places constraints on
exchanges in order to prevent future violations of water quality standards. By using a
conditional tradable permit system the authority can account for future changes on
watercourse properties. A conditional TDP system can be thought as a TDP system
indexed to the ambient conditions of each period.3 4 Thus, the number of TDPs are issued
by the authority for a limited period and this number can either fall or rise in the next
period. Unfortunately, under this approach the purchase of TDPs would not be riskless.
The initial flexibility given by them can be substantially reduced under this new context
of uncertainty about future conditions.3 5
Flexibility acquires large importance on irreversible investments such as a BOD
treatment plant. When the investment decision of building or expanding a treatment plant
34 The length of each period is subject to authority's criteria, but it should be primarily based on stream
flow rate and temperature. A six month period may be adequate.
35 David and Joeres (1983) point out that TDPs allow flexibility in operation, which is an advantage that
has to be stressed even it is hard to value in dollars.
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can be delayed by purchasing TDPs, there is a flexibility option, which becomes an
opportunity cost once the investment is made, that needs to be considered (Pindyck,
1991). The larger the opportunity costs the more attractive TDPs are. However, this
opportunity cost may be reduced by the uncertainty in the market. We develop a two-
period model that accounts for irreversibility in the investment and uncertainty in future
TDP prices.
Consider an individual firm, whose unrestricted BOD discharges are u, facing
two complementary options to comply with water quality standards: waste treatment
facilities and TDPs. Additionally, consider a conditional TDP system affecting a large
number of firms where the authority issues emission rights at the beginning of each
period.3 6 An individual firm receives emission rights equal to qol and qo2 in period 1 and
2 respectively. While qol is known at the beginning of period 1, qo2 is unknown and can
be bigger or smaller than qol. If at the beginning of period 2 the watercourse conditions
have not changed, so qo2 = qol, any individual firm that purchased TDPs in the first
period would only need to valid all its permits for next period. However, if watercourse
conditions have changed, so qo2 • qol, additional TDPs exchanges would be necessary.
It is very likely that TDP prices be subject to change when qo varies. Economic
activity, population growth and technology innovation can also affect prices in either
direction.3 7 If authority issues more emission rights in the next period, qo2 > qol, the
supply of TDPs is likely to increase and prices to fall; and if regulation becomes stricter,
qo2 < qol, demand for TDPs is likely to increase and prices to rise. We consider a known
price, pi, in the first period and an unknown price, P2, in the second period. We also
36 A large number of firms is a convenient hypothesis for two reasons: TDP prices can be assumed
exogenous to each exchange and they are always available. For the latter think of a new firm entering into a
system that have sufficient installed capacity (most existing water systems) to provide permits even under
adverse watercourse conditions.
3 7 Economic growth in the area can drive prices up by making the watercourse disposal capacity more
scarce, while technological innovation can drive prices down by decreasing the cost of pollution abatement.
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assume that there is no transaction costs in this problem. Their effects were already seen
and only will move the equilibrium further from the cost-effective solution.
Another aspect of the investment decision problem is the treatment plant capacity
choice. We consider the installed treatment capacity, c, as the maximum amount of BOD
the plant can reduce.3 8 We assume that c is chosen in the first period and remains fixed
for the two periods. 39 Later in the thesis we comment on this assumption. Capital costs
associated with the plant are known and based on the installed capacity c. These costs are
equalized throughout the amortization period, thus we have a capital cost equal to Cc(c)
for each period (Eheart et al., 1987).40 In addition, it is assumed that variable costs
associated with plant operation during the two periods depend on the amount of BOD
controlled, r. Furthermore, they may be reduced by utilizing only a percentage of the total
available capacity c.41 These variable costs are Cv(rl) and Cv(r2), where rl and r2 are the
BOD control levels in periods 1 and 2 respectively. As in section 2.1, Cv(') and CC(.) are
assuming increasing functions in their relevant ranges.
In summary, at period 1 purchaser of TDPs faces the following situation
Period 1 Period 2
Unrestricted BOD discharges u u
Discharge (emission) rights qol E(qo2)
Price per TDP P1 E(p2)
BOD controlled rl r2
38 BOD removal rates by treatment facilities usually range from low levels (e.g. 35%) to almost total
control (e.g. 98%). A typical treatment train is described in Eheart et al (1987).
39 In some cases level of control can go little beyond the installed capacity by increasing significantly
marginal operational costs.
40 The length of the amortization period does not make qualitative difference in the results. Eheart (1987)
for example considers a 20-year amortization period, and obtains [annualized] capital cost much higher
than [annual] operational costs.
41 The last assumption is important because some types of abatement plants cannot be operated much
below design capacity without damaging the biological processes involved.
28
TDPs purchased xl x2
Capital Costs Cc(c) Cc(c)
Variable Costs Cv(rl) CV(r2)
where qo2 and P2 are random variables, and xi and ri are always related by eq. (1) in order
to comply with regulations all the time.
In this thesis we are particularly interested in the effects of irreversibility and
uncertainty over c. First, we illustrate the case where pi and P2 are known at the
beginning of period 1, and where P2 can be smaller, bigger or equal to pi. Later we turn
back to the original problem where P2 is unknown at period 1. Without loss of generality,
we consider a profit-maximizing agent that always correspond a purchaser of TDPs for
any pair of prices P, P2. The situation for such a discharger is illustrated in Figure 3.
Depending on the conditions of the watercourse, emission rights, qO, can vary from qomin
to qomax. This implies that prices as a response to changes in q can move from pmax to
pmin. Notice that TDP price increases as the amount of emission rights decreases.
Because ranges of variations for p and q do not cross at any point, this firm will always
be a purchaser of TDPs (see Figure 3). The analysis can easily be extended for a pure
seller of permits or for a mixing one.
For a purchaser of TDPs the two-period wastewater treatment plant design
problem is given by
Min TC = Cc(c) + Cv(rl) + pl(u - rl - q01) +
1 + i [ C(c) + CV(r2) + p2-(u - r2 - qo2) ]
subject to
rl, r2 < c, and rl,r2 > 0, (14)
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Figure 3. The situation for a "pure" purchaser of permits that receives an amount
qomi n < qO < qomax of emission rights and faces a TDP price pmin < p <
pmax. According to the marginal cost of control, this emitting source
will always be better off buying permits than rather controlling at
higher levels and selling some of them. "u" is the unrestricted amount
of discharges.
where TC is the total cost of compliance considering TDPs; c, rl, and r2 are the decision
variables; and i is the relevant discount rate. Introducing slack variables, 1l and It2, the
Langrangean for the above problem is given by
L(c, rl, r2) = Cc(c) + Cv(rl) + pl(u - rl - qol) +
1
1-+i [Cc(c) + CV(r2) + p2(u - r2 -qo2)]
+ Xkl(rl + g12 -c) + X2-(r2 + -22- c), (15)
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where X1 and X2 are the Langrangean multipliers. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions lead to
the following solution (de Neufville, 1990)
a =[1 + c1 ]XXC2 (16)
aL pi + = (17)
a - lri -p + X = 0 (17)
aL aCv(r2) 1
ar2 ar2 l+i
aL
=r +12 - c
I+1
1
P2y ' + X2 =0
=0
aL r2 + 22 - c = 0
ax2
x1 1gl =0
X292 = 0
XI, 32 0.
There are three possible cases: (1) Xi > 0 and 2 = 0; (2) Xi = 0 and 2 > 0: and
(3) X1, 2 > 0.42 Each case will hold depending on pi and P2 values. It is not difficult to
demonstrate that the first case holds when p > P2, the second when pi < P2, and the third
one when P2 = P. First, if XI > 0 and 2 = 0, we have by eqs. (21) and (22) that g = 0
and g2 > 0. This implies that the first constraint is binding. Thus, by eqs. (19) and (20) we
obtain that rl = c and r2 < c. We know that X2 = 0 and that Xi can be derived from (17).
42 XI = X2 = 0 is not a corner solution for a purchaser of permits.
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(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
Replacing them into (16), we finally obtain an expression for the installed capacity, c. and
the BOD controlled in both periods, rl and r2, given by
av+ (1 + (c) = (1 + i)p+ (1 + i) a~- = + i)pI(2 + i) ac(c)
ri =c
av(r2)
DVr2 - P2,
where r < c. Similarly, for the second case where XI = 0 and X2 > 0, we obtain a set of
expressions for c, rl, and r2 given by
aCc(c)(2 + i) ac acv(c)+ ac = P2 (25)
(25a)aCv(rl)
arl = Pi
r2 = c, (25b)
where rl < c. Finally, we have the case where Xi, X2 > 0. In this case the set of equations
is given by
aCc(c)
ac
aCv(c)
c a p = P2 (26)
rl =r2 =c . (26a)
Eqs. (24), (25) and (26) are different forms of cost-effective solutions since prices
are known. Differences to the original cost-effective solution appear only when prices are
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(24)
(24a)
(24b)
different between periods, because agents care about the unused capacity that might occur
when TDP prices fall. This is the irreversibility effect, the fact that capacity in place need
not always be utilized. In the first two cases, agents incorporate the irreversibility effect
of the investment on the capacity choice formulation by taking into account the marginal
cost of unused capacity. Thus, to the original cost-effective solution, a term equal to
aCc(c)/ac/(l+i) and aCc(c)/ac is incorporated into eqs. (24) and (25) respectively. When
p is invariant, the irreversibility effect does not take place because there is no unused
capacity in either period. The result of incorporate the marginal cost of unused capacity
leads to lower levels of installed capacity, c. In other words, capital costs are weighed
more than others making agents to rely more in TDPs to comply with environmental
regulations.
That is the flexibility that David and Joeres (1983) notices. The value of this
flexibility increases as capital costs become proportionally larger than variable costs (He
and Pindyck, 1992). Thus, we can expect that TDPs become more attractive as
irreversible and larger investments need to be made. However, there is an additional
aspect that deserves much attention, that is, uncertainty. We now turn back into our
original problem. What happens to this flexibility and the installed capacity, c, when
future TDPs prices are uncertain? To solve this problem we consider a price pl in the first
period and a price P2 in the second period that will change by 0 (positive). With
probability q, it will rise to Pl + 0, and with probability (1 - q) it will fall to P - .43 The
neutral probability measure is q = 0.5 which leads to E(p2) = pi. We will next show that
for all agents that face upward sloping marginal variable and capital costs curves, and a
deviation coefficient 0, may have an effect on the capacity choice, c. It may eventually
discourage the TDP option by choosing a larger c.
43 This is a simple binomial distribution (independent Bernoulli trials) with step size "".
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For the time being we will stay with q, instead of 0.5, because it will help us to
understand the effects of different probability on the capacity choice. Thus, the two-
period wastewater treatment plant design problem is given by
Min TEC = Cc(c) + Cv(rl) + p.(u - rl - qol) +
q 1 i [Cc(c) + Cv(r2 +) + (Pi + 0)-(u - r2+ - qo2-) ] +
1(1 - q) [Cc(c) + CV(r2) + (P1- 0).(u - r2- -qo2 + ) ]
subject to
rl, r2+ , r2 < c, rl, r2+ , r2' 2 0, (27)
where TEC is the total expected cost; r2+ and r2- are the levels of BOD control for pi + 0
and pi - 0 respectively; and qo2' and qo2+ are the emissions rights relative to prices pi +
0 and P - 0 respectively. We know by eq. (24) that r2- < c (i > P2), and by eq. (25) that
r2+ is equal to c (P1 < P2). Since r2- < c, the Langrangean multiplier associated with it is
zero. Thus, our constraints are reduced only the regarded with rl. Making r2+ equal to c,
the Langrangean multiplier of (27) becomes
L(c, rl, r2) = Cc(c) + Cv(rl) + pl(u - rl - qol) +
q 1 + [Cc(c) + Cv(c) + (p + 0).(u - c - qo2') ] +
1(1 - q) i [Cc(c) + Cv(r2') + (P - 0).(u - r2 - qo2+) ]+ Xl(rl + 112 - c). (28)
Solving equation (28) leads to two cases: (1) X > 0 and rl = c, and (2) Xi = 0 and
rl c. Either solution will be valid depending on the value of the different parameters,
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including 0. To illustrate the effects of 0, we will only present at this point the solution
for both cases. Later, in section IV, we come back to this issue and others related to the
differences between both solutions. The solution for the first case is such that
aCc(c) aCv(c)(2+i) ac +(1+i+q) ac =(1 + i + q) pl + q0, (29)
and the solution for the second case is such that
aCc(c) a(c))(2+i) ac + q ac (P +0) q (30)
where 0 > 0, i > 0, and 0 < q < 1. Notice that for q = 0 (certain that price will fall )
equations (29) and (24) are identical, and for q = 1 (certain that price will rise) equation
(30) and (25) are identical.
A curve c = c(o) can be obtained by solving the partial differential eq. (29). Since
no functional form for CC and Cv are given, we can only conform with an arbitrary
shape for c(o). Because CC and Cv were assumed strictly increasing in c (and r), c(0) will
be a smooth curve increasing in 0, as shown in Figure 4. Additionally, we include ce, the
cost-effective solution when there is no uncertainty and prices remain unchanged over
time. This solution is obtained from eq. (26). In addition, we have that c(0) shifts up or
down due to changes in q, such as shown in Figure 4. When price is more likely to raise
(q > 0.5) c(0) shifts up, which implies that the flexibility is less worthy. Notice that as q
tends to 1 and 0 to 0, c tends to ce. Thus, when price is more likely to rise so do levels of
BOD control and costs. The analysis for eq. (30) is similar to the above.
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Figure 4. Wastewater treatment plant capacity, c, as a function of price
variability, 0, and probability, q (q > 0.5 implies price is more likely to
rise). The cost-effective capacity choice when price remains constant is
Ce.
For an agent that expect prices to remain constant over time (q = 0.5), the effects
of price deviation 0 on installed capacity choice may have different effects depending on
its value. There is a value 0, however, where the effect is neutral, that is, the firm installs
capacity at the level ce (see Figure 4). At this point the marginal benefits of the flexibility
is equal to its marginal cost. Such as pointed out by He and Pindyck (1992), given the
uncertainty over future prices, the more flexible capacity has an obvious advantage, but it
is also more costly. In our case, more flexible capacity means more TDPs. Thus, the
advantage of using TDPs is in reducing the unused capacity at a minimum, and its
marginal cost is simply the permit price. As 0 increases the marginal benefit of the option
decreases -- because the unused capacity increases (lower r) -- relative to the marginal
cost of the option equal to E(p2). The flexibility net value will only be positive for small
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values of 0 (< 00) where firms will install capacity at level lower than ce. Therefore, the
attractiveness of the option, that is TDP, decreases as price variability increases.
37
IV. EXTENSIONS
In the preceding analysis we have shown that uncertainty either coming from
direct or indirect authority intervention can adversely affect the trading activity in a
market for water pollution control. In this section we rather focus on two specific issues
associated with these remarks. The first part deals with the effects of the interaction
between regulated and regulator on the level of pollution control and the distribution of
transaction costs before and after the approval, and the second one with the dynamics of
the capacity choice problem.
4.1 Interaction Between Regulated and Regulator
In section 3.1 we concluded that uncertainty has adverse effects on trading
activity. Additionally we mentioned that interaction between regulator and regulated can
have ambiguous effects on the trading, leading to either higher or lower levels of
pollution control compare to the case of no interaction. This ambiguity effects lies on the
fact that agents distribute their before and after approval transaction costs differently (TA
and TT respectively) depending on the "interaction function". For example, if interaction
is very sensitive to TA, agents may be willing to rise TA and thus improve the expectation
of the transfer success. In this part of the thesis, we want to develop this idea of
ambiguity a little further. We are particularly interested in two issues: the effects of the
interaction function in the amount of TDPs exchanged and the temporal distribution of
transaction costs.
Let x (amount of TDP exchanged) be a function of CA, p, TA, TT and Ps, such as
x = x(CA, p, TA, TT, Ps). This expression comes explicitly on either eq. (II1). On the other
hand the interaction function is implicit on Ps = Ps(TA, x), such as shown in eq. (8). The
differential for these functions is given by
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dx = [A]- ldCA + [aTA]-ldTA + [aTT]-dTT + [as]-ldPs (31)
dPs= a-- dx + A dTA, (32)ax aTA
where dx and dPs represent the total change on x and Ps and respectively. The interaction
function expressed on eq. (32) will have no effect on x if dx = 0. To find the condition of
neutrality we plug (32) into (31) and let dx = 0. This latter implies also that dCA = 0.
Thus, the condition of neutrality for x can be written as
aPs/ax -1 [aTA]- [aTT]-1 dTT _ (33)
aT3+ ['] l dTA
where the first terms is the interaction term that appears in (13) as well, and dTT/dTA
reflects the temporal distribution of transaction costs between after and before approval.
Since the first term of (33) is negative (aPs/ax < 0), the second one positive, and the third
one negative (dTT/dTA assumed negative),4 4 neutrality can hold under certain set of
conditions. As conditions change (33) may turn positive or negative, making x rises or
falls respectively.
As an example consider a change in the distribution of transaction costs. If we
assume that TA and TT are substitute, and increase in TA drives dTT/dTA up (less
negative), and with it x. This was expected since more resources are devoted to improve
Ps. An increase in TA also affects aPs/aTA rising x even more. However, the opposite
effect can result from the aTA/ax term. There is room for more speculation, but indeed,
little more can be said since Ps is unknown, and so is the relationship between TA and TT.
44 A negative slope comes from the fact that TA and TT are somehow substitutes.
39
Were these functions are unknown, we limit ourselves saying that the interaction function
may help making the TDP option more attractive. Unfortunately, the opposite is also
possible. That is the ambiguity effect.
4.2 Capacity Choice Under a Conditional TDP System
In section 3.2, we left the differences between (29) and (30) and the implications
on the capacity choice problem for this section. This analysis will show us how installed
capacity and its subsequent use are determined under TDP price uncertainty.
Eqs. (29) and (30) represent two different capacity choice curves, c = cl(0) and c
= c2(0) respectively. We will show in a moment that cl(0) and c(0) are not
complementary, and that the optimal path, c*(0, q), is given by
c*(0, q) = max{cl(0, q), c2(0, q)}, 0 >0, and 0 < q < 1, (34)
where cl(0, q) is the case when rl = c, and c2(0, q) when rl < c. Independent of q (you
may take the risk-neutrality value 0.5), when 0 approaches to zero (but always 0 > 0),
cl(0 =0) becomes greater than c2(0 =0), and when 0 approaches to infinity, 45 Cl(0 = oo)
becomes smaller than c2(0 = oo). Since both curves are continuous, there must be a point,
E, where cl = c2, such as shown in Figure 5. Making (30) equal to (29) leads to
aCV(c) I Pi, acc(c) I E qO (35)
ac cEP1a ~c cE -2+i (35)
where CE is the point of the optimal path, c*, where both curves, c and c2 crosses; and 0 E
is the corresponding price deviation. Notice that cE is always greater than ce, the cost-
45 In reality 0 is bounded. We make it large only to compare both cases.
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effective solution. To the left of the crossing point, E, c2(0) does not hold because
otherwise rl, which is given by (25a), would be larger than c. Thus, to the left of E the
optimal path c* is given by cl(0) that is in according to (34). To the right of E, the
optimal path is given by c2. The latter can be explained assuming you stand on 0 = 0 E and
take an infinitesimal positive increment dO. To maintain the first order conditions
associated with (28) unchanged, we require rl to increase by drl > 0. This is only possible
when rl is not bounded by above, that is, when rl < c.46
Even though we are in a more conservative situation regarding capacity choice
(larger c), all the qualitative analysis in part 3.2 regarding benefits and costs of the
flexibility of using TDPs apply similarly here. In summary, for smaller variations in
price, all the installed capacity is expected to be used during the first period. However, as
price variability increases agents may rather chose bigger installed capacity to cover
future TDP price fluctuation even though some of this capacity is not used in the first
period -- TDPs are more convenient. Finally, we still can have the situation of dischargers
installing treatment capacity at levels lower than the cost-effective solution. For these
firms the flexibility option values more than its cost. Were the latter is possible,
transaction costs -- not considered in this part of the thesis -- must be very low, something
that is not likely to happen. In summary, indirect authority intervention by indexing
emission rights to ambient conditions and natural price variability may induce agents for
more conservative capacity design and consequently to disregard trading options.
46 See supra note 39. If r can be extended beyond c, cl (0) can still hold a little further to the right of E, but
most probably we will have a new curve in between due to the increase in marginal operational costs.
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c*=max( cl(0), C2 ( ) }
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C
Figure 5. The installed capacity choice, c*, and the capacity use problem under
conditions of irreversibility and TDP price variability. For low values
of 0 (< OE) there is no unused capacity during the first period (cl
holds). while for high values of 0 (> E) there is some unused capacity
in the first period (c2 holds). Notice that the capacity use for the
second period will depend on P2.
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V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Should transferable discharge permits (TDPs) be considered as a feasible mean to
attain water quality goals in spite of unsuccessful attempts and adverse factors? Although
the answer is obvious, questions will arise in the design and assessment process.
Uncertainty was shown to have adverse consequences in the market performance. Its
implication from a public policy perspective and other issues related to market design are
addressed in this section. We start from an overview of the limitations and advantages of
marketable permits in environmental regulation, to some comments on design issues and
final remarks.
The enthusiasm for using marketable permits (at least as a complementary
regulatory mechanism) for different environmental problems is increasing. There are
further attempts to use them in the water sector. Recent evidence indicates that nonpoint
source pollution from urban and rural areas has increased relative to point source
pollution (industrial facilities and wastewater treatment plant), and that in some cases
little improvement in water quality can be achieved by only tightening point sources.
Pollution trading between point and nonpoint sources appears as a feasible option at a
minimum cost (U.S. EPA, 1992). In addition, there are suggestions for using a permit
system to control CO 2 emissions (Bohm, 1992). Much of the support for this approach
over traditional command-and-control instruments comes from the fact that the former
can attain the same environmental quality goals at a much lower costs. Efficiency and
cost-effectiveness, however, are by no means the unique criteria for judging
environmental policies (Hahn and Stavins, 1992).
Under conditions of uncertainty and transaction costs cost-effectiveness can
decrease and others aspects such as equity, political feasibility, ease of implementation,
and technology innovation, may claim in favor of more uniform approaches.4 7
47 Inequity in a TDP system may rise, among others, from the fact that new sources does not receive
emission rights and concentration of damage (hot spots).
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Technology innovation, for example, have been lately recognized as the primary goal for
pollution control and more importantly for pollution prevention. In that context,
economists continue to claim that market-based instruments provide larger incentives for
the development and adoption of new pollution control technologies. Much of it lies in
the fact that innovation is more responsive to dynamic regulations such as market-based
approaches. However, like in a TDP system, the absence of trading may depress
incentives for innovation. In summary, typical estimate gains from trading (e.g.
Tietenberg (1985)) need to be reassessed. The model presented here is such an attempt.
In designing any environmental policies for water pollution control, policymakers
will face a multiple-objective decision problem. As we reduce the problem to efficiency
and environmental quality considerations the TDP option receives more attention. In
addition to the market setup, the authority can require direct or indirect market
intervention to prevent future violations of water quality standards. The Fox River
program, in Wisconsin, is a case of direct intervention in the form of ad hoc approval
(EPA, 1992; and David and Joeres, 1983), and a conditional TDP system (Eheart et al.,
1987), where emissions right are indexed to ambient conditions is an example of indirect
intervention. In either system transaction costs and uncertainty can be significant adverse
effects in the trading activity such as shown in this study.
Transaction costs have shown to be significant in different markets for pollution
control. The magnitude and nature of transaction costs is likely to differ from case to
case. As we move from simpler permits designs (e.g. inputs and emissions) towards more
sophisticate ones (e.g. ambient, exposure and risk) is expected to have greater public
costs associated with monitoring and enforcement and greater private transaction costs
(Stavins, 1994). Since more sophisticate approaches allow more control of standards
violations (e.g. an ambient BOD permit system) but also higher transaction costs (in any
form) there is no simple answer.
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Some general suggestion to reduce transaction costs are: increasing the scale of
individual transfers (fixed transaction costs are reduced), reducing opposition to
exchanges, providing greater dissemination about potential buyers and sellers and thus
help sources to identify one another, establishing periodic data reports that would bring
information about existing and potential exchanges among all parties, and finally
providing broader brokerage services aimed to legally and technically assist interested
parties. Some of the suggestion for decreasing transaction costs also would seem to
increase the probability that transfer attempts will be successful. Other suggestions for
decreasing transaction costs, such as increasing the volume of TDPs in each exchange,
might actually increase uncertainty and hence reduce the probability of success (Lund,
1993).
Uncertainty comes in different forms and some are more damaging to the market
strategy than others. There is uncertainty associated to the approval process and to
technical conditions (e.g. droughts). Establishing firmer regulatory and legal guidelines
for both the TDP exchange and third-parties compensation and bargaining processes,
risks should decrease and attempts for transfers should rise. Notice that some of these
measures may also increase transaction costs but the net effect is expected to be positive.
On the other hand, the authority should assume some of the risk of future violations by
setting a water quality schedule that could allow eventual violations under adverse
watercourse conditions and thus help to keep the interest of discharges in TDP options.
With respect to the institutional aspects of market structure, the primary indication
is that permits markets in the case of water are thin (O'Neil, 1980; and Eheart, 1980). As
the number of potential traders decreases so does cost effectiveness of the permit system.
Consequently planners may wish to define the markets broadly and attempt to include as
many agents as possible. However, as the market is expanded, the probability of quality
standards violations (e.g. DO levels) due to trading increases (O' Neil, 1980). Again,
there is no one answer.
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Before a practicable policy of TDP may be implemented, its legal feasibility,
procedure for enforcement, and the detailed administrative structure must be determined.
This will substantially differ from case to case. Perhaps, we should start from those
programs that are more likely to succeed.4 8 We need to learn from encouraging
experiences and thus increase the support from policymakers and the general public
towards alternative solutions for the water pollution problem and others as well.
48 For example, O'Neil (1983) suggested in his study that the cost differential between the market solution
and alternate strategies appears so large that even serious operational difficulties may be unlikely to erase
the advantage of the market.
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APPENDIX
To understand the theory of a marketeable permit system let us first consider N
polluters emitting ui units of emission each (e.g. kg/day of BOD)a in the absence of any
control (ui is the unrestricted emissions level for source i). Furthermore suppose that the
pollutant concentration KR (BOD level in mg/lt) at some receptor point R in the absence
of control is
N
KR= aiui + B (Al)
i=l
where B is the background concentration and ai is the transfer coefficient associated to
source i.b Since KR is supposed to be greater than LR, the legal concentration level, the
regulatory problem becomes to choose the cost-effective level of control ri for each of the
N sources in the system. The authority rather than choose these levels by itself it will
establish a marketable permit system. The cost-effective solution obtained from the
tradable permit system can be derived by the following minimization problem
N
min Ci(ri)
i=l
N
s.t. (ui- ri )ai = LR (A2)
i=l
a Emission is the product of the concentration of pollutant in the effluent (mg/lt of BOD) and the load of
effluents (It/day).
b The background concentration may come from sources aout of the system under consideration. The
transfer coefficient represents the relative impact of emissions at "i" on location R. The larger ai the larger
the impact relative to other location. When location does not matter all transafer coefficients are equal to
the unity. If you wish assume B=O and all ai equal to 1).
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where Ci(ri) is the cost of achieving the ri level of control at the ith source. Introducing
the Langrangean multiplier, X, the minimization problems becomes
N N
min Ci(ri) + X L (ui- r)ai-LR] (A3)
i=l i=l
and the solution is found by partially differentiating (A3) with respect to X and each of
the ri's. This yields
aCiri) X* aj >0, i = 1,2, ... N,
ri -
N
(ui- ri )ai = LR (A4)
i=l
Solving these equations produces the N-dimensional vector r* and the scalar .*.c
There is an important meaning attached to X. If transferable permits were being
used, it would be the market clearing price of a permit that allow to emit such an amount
that raise the concentration at the receptor location one unit. Given this "price" of
pollution permit, X, notice how firms choose emissions control. Each firms is assumed
profit maximizer, so they will try to minimize cost of pollution control. Assume that each
firm is given an initial amount of permits equal to qoi, where the regulatory authority
ensures that
N
_ ai qoi = LR (A5)
n=l
for all emitters in the system. A ith profit maximizer firm would want to
c In the case of J receptors aij would become a NxJ matrix, and both LR and X* would become J-
dimensional vectors.
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min Ci(ri) + p*-((ui - ri) ai - qoi)
and the solution will be given by
)Ci(ri*) p* ai=O 0 (A7)
This condition (marginal cost equals the price of a unit of concentration reduction
in a point R of the receptor) would hold for each of the N firms. Because p* would equal
X* and the number of permits would be chosen to ensure the ambient standard [in R1
would be met, this allocation would be cost-effective. Notice that when transfer
coefficients ai (i=1,...,N) are different across sources the marginal cost of pollution
control is also different. On the other hand, if transfer coefficients are equal to the unity
all sources will control at the same marginal costs equal to p*.
51
(A6)
